Inferring health conditions from fMRI-graph data by Mana, PierGianLuca Porta et al.
 Inferring health conditions 
from fMRI-graph data 
P.G.L. Porta Mana 1, C. Bachmann 2 , ∗,A. Morrison 2 , 3 , 4 
1Kavli Institute for Systems Neuroscience, NTNU Norwegian University of Science 
and Technology, Norway 
2Institute of Neuroscience and Medicine (INM-6) and Institute for Advanced 
Simulation (IAS-6) and JARA BRAIN Institute I, Jülich Research Centre, Jülich, 
Germany 
3Simulation Laboratory Neuroscience, Inst. for Advanced Simulation, JARA, Jülich 
Research Centre and JARA, Jülich, Germany 
4Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, Faculty of Psychology, Ruhr-University 
Bochum, Germany 
Correspondence*:
C. Bachmann
c.bachmann@fz-juelich.de 
30 January 2018; updated 3 May 2018 
ABSTRACT 
Automated classification methods for disease diagnosis are currently in the limelight, especially 
for imaging data. Classification does not fully meet a clinician’s needs, however: in order to 
combine the results of multiple tests and decide on a course of treatment, a clinician needs the 
likelihood of a given health condition rather than binary classification yielded by such methods. 
We illustrate how likelihoods can be derived step by step from first principles and approximations, 
and how they can be assessed and selected, using fMRI data from a publicly available data set 
containing schizophrenic and healthy control subjects, as a working example. We start from the 
basic assumption of partial exchangeability, and then the notion of sufficient statistics and the 
“method of translation” (Edgeworth, 1898) combined with conjugate priors. This method can be 
used to construct a likelihood that can be used to compare different data-reduction algorithms. 
Despite the simplifications and possibly unrealistic assumptions used to illustrate the method, we 
obtain classification results comparable to previous, more realistic studies about schizophrenia, 
whilst yielding likelihoods that can naturally be combined with the results of other diagnostic tests. 
Keywords: disease diagnosis, decision theory, sufficient statistics, exchangeability, parametric statistical model, schizophrenia, fMRI, 
Bayesian probability theory 
1 INTRODUCTION 
A 29-year-old man seeks medical advice because he finds himself in a very confused state. The clinician, 
after listening to the complaints of the patient, identifies some diseases that would account for the 
symptoms. However, the presentation is not clear cut, and treatment for some of the potential conditions 
have significant side effects. To come to a decision on the best course of action, the clinician decides to 
perform the differential diagnosis in a mathematically sound manner (Sox et al., 2013), first assigning an 
initial probability for the patient’s being healthy or having each of the potential conditions, taking into
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account age, sex, familial factors, symptoms, a psychological evaluation, the incidence of the disease, and 
similar prior information: 
P( health condition | prior info ) . (1) 
Then she orders one or more diagnostic tests to make a better informed assessment of the probabilities 
of the considered diseases. Among these tests she orders a structural and functional magnetic-resonance 
imaging (MRI) scan. The advantage of MRI lies in the non-invasive monitoring of brain structure and 
activity; the structural image (sMRI) is used to exclude morphological changes in the brain such as tumours, 
and the functional imaging (fMRI) can provide information about changes in brain activity. 
With the results of the tests and of the sMRI and fMRI, the clinician updates her initial or prior probability 
to a “post-test” or posterior probability based on the results, according to Bayes’s theorem: 
post-test probability︷ ︸︸ ︷ 
P( health condition | results of all tests ∧ prior info ) ∝ 
initial probability︷ ︸︸ ︷ 
P( health condition | prior info ) × 
likelihoods 
   
P( result of first test | health condition ∧ prior info ) × 
P( result of second test | health condition ∧ prior info ) × 
· · · × 
P( result of sMRI | health condition ∧ prior info ) × 
P( result of fMRI | health condition ∧ prior info ) 
(2) 
where “ ∧ ” denotes logical conjunction (“and”), and we have reasonably assumed that the result of each 
test does not depend on those of the other tests, i.e. that their likelihoods are independent (Jaynes, 2003, 
§ 4.2; Sox et al., 2013, § 4.7). 
In the update formula above, the initial probability is assessed by the clinician. To calculate the post-test 
probability she needs the probabilities for each test result conditional on the health condition, either 
“healthy” or “presumptive disease”. These probabilities are called the likelihoods for the health condition 
in view of each test. The term “likelihood” has its standard technical meaning in the present work: the 
probability of a proposition A given B is P( A | B ) , while the likelihood of A in view of B is P( B | A ) , 
i.e., A appears in the conditional (Jaynes, 2003, § 4.1; Good, 1950, § 6.1). A proposition can have high 
probability but low likelihood and vice versa. Probabilities, not likelihoods, are what we base our decisions 
upon. 
The final, post-test probability is necessary to the clinician to decide upon a course of action (Sox et al., 
2013, ch. 6; Goodman, 1999; Murphy, 2012, § 5.7); for example, to treat the patient according to one or 
another specific treatment, to dismiss him, or to order more tests. To make such decision the clinician will 
combine her post-test probabilities for the health conditions with a utility table (a reminder of decision 
theory is given in § 4.3). 
In the following we assume that one of the presumptive diseases the clinician has in her mind is 
schizophrenia. Although currently MRI does not play a role in a diagnosis of schizophrenia, there are 
substantial efforts to develop such analyses for this purpose (Silva and Calhoun, 2014). In this work, we 
focus on the diagnosis of this particular disease simply as a concrete worked example, to demonstrate how
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results of a diagnostic test, in this case results from function MRI imaging, can be incorporated in the 
diagnostic process in a principled fashion. 
In short, we address the question: how can we assign a numerical value to the likelihood 
P( fMRI result | health condition ∧ prior info ) . (3) 
of each health condition (’healthy’ or ’schizophrenic’) in view of the fMRI result? We will propose 
an answer that can be applied for any brain disease. 
To this end it is useful to mark out some features of the approach presented so far: 
I. Modularity. The update formula (2) combines evidence from different tests, and this combination 
does not need to be done at once. The clinician can multiply her initial probability by the likelihood from 
the first test, normalize, and thus obtain a “post-first-test” probability. Later she can multiply this probability 
by the likelihood from the second test, normalize, and thus obtain a post-second-test probability; and so on 
with any number of other tests, a number that the clinician needs not fix in advance. She can therefore store 
the value of the likelihood from the fMRI result, to later combine it with new likelihoods from future tests 
to form a new, better-informed post-test probability. 
II. Decision-theoretic character. The clinician’s final goal is not simply a healthy/schizophrenic classi- 
fication, but a decision upon a course of action about the patient (Sox et al., 2013, chs 6, 7; Jaynes, 2003, 
chs 13, 14; Raiffa and Schlaifer, 2000). This distinction is important: for example, a treatment without 
contraindications might be recommended even if there is only a 10% probability that the disease is present; 
or a dangerous treatment might be recommended only if there is a 90% probability that the disease is 
present. 
The modularity of the present approach extends to the decision stage, because the post-test probability 
can be used with different decisions and utilities, which can also be updated later on. For example, after 
beginning a treatment the clinician happens to read about a new kind of treatment, having new benefits and 
contraindications. Using the post-test probabilities she already has, she may re-evaluate her decision using 
an updated utility table that includes the new treatment. 
III. Incomplete knowledge. In general, we lack a complete biological understanding of the relation 
between brain activity and the health condition under study. In this case, the likelihoods can only be 
assessed by relying on examples of known health condition–fMRI data pairs, usually called a training or 
calibrating dataset. Moreover, this training dataset is often very small. 
IV. High dimensionality. The fMRI data are positive-valued vectors with 107– 108 components or more 
(Lindquist, 2008). This high dimension impacts the calculation of likelihoods and probabilities. 
The first two points above are great advantages of the present approach, and also the reasons why it 
cannot be based on machine learning algorithms for deterministic classification; such methods give the 
clinician a dichotomous, “healthy/schizophrenic” answer, with no associated uncertainty. This answer 
cannot be used by the clinician to weigh the benefits and risks of different courses of action, the assessment 
of which needs the probabilities of the health conditions. Probabilistic algorithms, on the other hand, are 
not flexible for combining evidence: they give a probability for the health condition, not a likelihood; 
and only the latter can be combined with the likelihoods from other tests, or stored for later reuse and 
combination. 
We therefore approach the question of assigning the likelihoods (3) by means of the probability calculus, 
the same calculus from which eq. (2) is derived. What we will do is in essence no different from current
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Bayesian statistical analyses and modelling; but we would like to emphasize some aspects of this modelling 
that are usually left in the background. The probability calculus can be regarded as the extension of formal 
logic (truth calculus) to plausible inference (Jeffreys, 2003; Jaynes, 2003; Hailperin, 1996), a view also 
supported in medicine (Greenland, 1998; Maclure, 1998; Goodman, 1999), which has been proven with 
increasing rigour by Koopman (1940b; 1940a; 1941), Cox (1946; 1961; 1979), Pólya (1949; 1968), and 
many others (Horvitz et al., 1986; Paris, 2006; Halpern, 1999; Snow, 1998; Dupré and Tipler, 2009; 
Terenin and Draper, 2017). The derivation of a probability proceeds much like an “axioms → logic rules → 
theorem” derivation in formal logic: one starts from the probabilities of some propositions, and by applying 
the probability rules, arrives at the probability of the desired proposition, eq. (3) in our case. 
We will show this procedure step by step in the case of our problem, in order to expose where assumptions 
and approximations enter the derivation. These may be improved by other researchers, or replaced by 
different ones when the method is applied to a different problem. Our discussion is inspired by Mosteller & 
Wallace’s (Mosteller and Wallace, 1963) brilliant, thoughtful analysis of a statistically similar problem in a 
very different context. 
The approach we follow deals naturally with the four points listed above. The small size of the training 
dataset, point III. above, is not an issue because the probability calculus allows for training datasets of any 
size. In fact, the calculus allows us to continuously update our inferences given new training data, making 
our inferences more and more precise and less likely to be affected by outliers. 
The unmanageable size of our data space, point IV. above, will force us to make auxiliary assumptions 
that will translate into the choice of a reduced data space, discussed in § 2.3, and into the use of parametric 
statistical models, discussed in § 2.4. Regarding the latter, we will emphasize that assumptions about 
relevant and irrelevant information in our data may translate into mathematical statistical models. It is 
often difficult to relate biophysical considerations about quantities measured in the brain to the shape 
of a probability distribution, especially in multidimensional quantities. The notion of sufficient statistics 
(Dawid, 2013; Bernardo and Smith, 2000, ch. 4; Lindley, 2008, § 5.5; Diaconis and Freedman, 1981; 
Cifarelli and Regazzini, 1982; Lauritzen, 1988; Kallenberg, 2005), discussed in § 2.4.2, is a helpful bridge 
between biophysical considerations and probability distributions. The idea is that it may be easier for us to 
conceive a connection between biophysical considerations and some special statistics of our measurements, 
than between biophysical considerations and an abstract multidimensional distribution function. This 
“translation” is powerful, because if one finds the assumptions about relevance or irrelevance of some data 
unreasonable, one can then make different assumptions, resulting in a different statistical model. 
Models inspired by sufficient statistics – especially their comparison and selection – can nevertheless be 
computationally demanding owing to the multidimensional integrals in their formulae, even when these 
are addressed by modern numerical methods such as Monte Carlo (MacKay, 2003, ch. IV; Murphy, 2012, 
chs 23–24). In the present study we shall use analytically tractable statistical models, but availing ourselves 
of Edgeworth’s “Method of Translation” (1898; Johnson, 1949; Mead, 1965): the simple but potentially 
very fertile idea of transforming a quantity into a normally distributed one, discussed in § 2.4.3. 
The possible combined choices of reduction of the data space, of sufficient statistics, and of transforma- 
tions into normal variable, lead to a variety of possible models and likelihoods to be used by the clinician. 
Which is the “best” one? We discuss several criteria for choice in § 2.5, settling on one based on expected 
utility. We also briefly discuss the remarkable observation that common Bayesian criteria based on weight 
of evidence and Bayes factors (Jeffreys, 2003, chs V, VI, A; Good, 1950; MacKay, 1992a; Kass and 
Raftery, 1995) for the fMRI data gives results opposite to those of the expected-utility criterion.
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In this article, we will calculate the likelihoods for the health conditions, eq. (3) , and assess the models 
for so doing, in the following steps. First, in § 2.1, we briefly discuss schizophrenia and the use of fMRI to 
diagnose it, introducing a concrete dataset of fMRI data for schizophrenic and healthy patients. We then 
show that a simple and natural assumption, called exchangeability , would lead to a unique value of the 
likelihoods (3) if the training dataset were large enough (§ 2.2). However, with a small training dataset we 
must face two problems: unmanageably large dimensions of the data space, and the need to specify prior 
beliefs, also involving functions on infinite-dimensional spaces. 
To solve the first problem, in § 2.3 we assume that information adequate for our health inference can be 
found in a reduced data space of the fMRI, which we construct from time correlations between groups 
of voxels. To solve the second problem we introduce parametric statistical models in § 2.4 using the 
notions of sufficient statistics and of transformation into normal variables, mentioned above. We discuss 
how these models learn from the data and select three models as possible candidates. We then consider 
several criteria to select one of the three models against our data, as an example, and discuss how a more 
realistic assessment could be made in a real application (§ 2.5 ). We conclude with a discussion (§ 3) on 
how the choice of sufficient statistics and prior probabilities could be improved, and on the relation to 
machine-learning methods. 
Our statistical terminology and notation follow ISO standards ( ISO , 2009, 2006). 
2 RESULTS 
2.1 Selection of clinical use case and fMRI-data acquisition 
Schizophrenia is a psychiatric disorder that comprises various symptoms that are categorized into positive 
(e.g. hallucinations), negative (e.g. loss of motivation) and cognitive (e.g. memory impairment) disease 
patterns. A common disease cause for all these widespread symptoms is still unknown. Functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) has been used to gain insight into modifications in functional connectivity 
in this disease. In the resting state, functional connectivity is measured either by asking the subject to 
fulfil a certain task or at rest, instructing the subject to think about nothing specific but not fall asleep. 
In this condition, both increased and decreased functional connectivity have been reported in the default 
mode network, although the hyperactivity seems to be reported more often (Hu et al., 2017). Moreover, 
widespread connectivity changes in the dorsal attention network and the executive control network have 
been detected (Woodward et al., 2011; Yu et al., 2016). 
Beyond these individual sub-networks, many studies have found profound changes in macroscopic brain 
structures, e.g. a shrinkage of whole brain and ventricular volume, reduced gray matter in frontal, temporal 
cortex and thalamus, and changes in white matter volume in frontal and temporal cortex (Shenton et al., 
2010; Ellison-Wright and Bullmore, 2009, 2010). Since both gray matter loss and white matter changes are 
found, it is reasonable to conclude that not only the intrinsic activity of single areas is modified, but also 
the interplay of different brain areas, in particular in frontal and temporal cortex. It has been argued that 
these alterations in long range connectivity are responsible for a range of disease symptoms that are not 
attributable to single areas (Friston and Frith, 1995). Taking this disconnect hypothesis as a starting point, 
we can reach the working hypothesis that these changes are also reflected in the functional activity of the 
brain, and that fMRI images can be used to distinguish schizophrenic from healthy patients. We therefore 
conclude that schizophrenia is an appropriate condition to demonstrate our approach.
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We requested data of schizophrenic and healthy patients from Schizconnect1, a virtual database for 
public schizophrenia neuroimaging data. In our request we asked for resting state T2*-weighted functional 
(rfMRI) and T1-weighted structural magnet resonance images (MRI) from patients participating in the 
COBRE study either with no known disorder or diagnosed as schizophrenic according to the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) IV, excluding schizoaffective disorders. In the COBRE 
study, the voluntary and informed participation of the subjects was ensured by the institutional guidelines 
at the University of New Mexico Human Research Protections Office. The ensuing dataset comprised 
91 healthy patients and 74 schizophrenic patients. Out of these we randomly selected 54 healthy and 49 
schizophrenic subjects, to permit demonstration our method on a small dataset with unequal group size. 
A detailed description on the exact experimental design and the MRI scanning is provided by Çetin et al. 
(2014). 
2.2 Calculation of probabilities: exchangeability 
Let us describe our context more precisely and set up some mathematical notation. We have: 
• A number of possible health conditions, in our example healthy ( H ) and schizophrenic ( S ). The variable 
c denotes health condition. 
• A space of possible fMRI data. They are vectors with 107– 108 or more positive components (Lindquist, 
2008). The variable f denotes an fMRI result. 
• A set of n patients, labelled in some way, the variable i denoting their labels. These labels may 
reflect information about the times the patients were examined, or about their geographical location. This 
possibility is important in the considerations to follow. In our study n = 104 . 
• Knowledge of the health condition and of the fMRI result of each patient. Let us use the propositions 
C c i := “Patient i has health condition c ” , 
F f i := “The fMRI of patient i gives f ” , 
(4) 
the latter to be understood within a very small interval ( f , f + d f ) . In our study we have nH = 55 healthy 
and nS = 49 schizophrenic patients. 
For brevity we denote by C c the conjunction of the propositions C c i for all patients having health condition 
c , i.e. our knowledge about which patients have that health condition; and analogously for F c. By D c we 
denote all data about patients with health condition c ; by D we denote all our data. 
• An imaginary patient, labelled “ 0 ”, whose fMRI result f is known, but whose health condition is not. 
• Other pre-test information, denoted by I ; for example the clinician’s initial diagnosis of the health 
condition of patient 0 , and the results of any other diagnostic tests. 
• The probabilities (ˆ pH , ˆ pS) for the health condition of patient 0 , conditional on the pre-test information, 
including the results from other tests. We call these pre-test probabilities . Note that they may differ from 
the initial probabilities of eqs (1)–(2), because they may include the likelihoods from other tests. 
• A set of decisions about the patient 0 and their utilities conditional on the patient’s health condition. We 
shall simply consider two decisions: dismiss ( D ) or treat ( T ). See § 4.3 for a summary of decision theory. 
Our goal is to assign numerical values to the likelihoods for the health conditions (3) : the conditional 
probability distribution that the fMRI result of patient “ 0 ” is f given the health condition of that patient
1 http://schizconnect.org/
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and all other data. In our notation, 
p( F f 0 | C c 0 ∧ C c11 ∧ F f1 1 ∧ · · · ∧ C cnn ∧ F fnn ∧ I ) d f 
or just p( F f 0 | C c 0 ∧ D ∧ I ) d f . 
(5) 
A natural assumption helps us restrict the values the distribution above may have. Within a group of 
patients having the same health condition we assume that the probability that a patient shows a particular 
fMRI fi does not depend on the particular value of the patient’s label i , no matter how many patients we 
have or may later add in that health group. This assumption is called partial exchangeability (de Finetti, 
1938; Diaconis and Freedman, 1981; Aldous, 1985; Diaconis, 1988). If the labels carry e.g. temporal or 
geographical information, partial exchangeability means that we do not expect to observe particular kinds 
of fMRI results more often in the future than in the past, or more frequently in one location than another. 
As a concrete example: fix three possible fMRI results f1, f2, f3 (each is a vector with 107– 108 positive 
components) and consider the fMRI tests of three schizophrenic patients: say, one from five years ago 
in Germany, one from last week in Scotland, and one to be done six months from now in Italy. Partial 
exchangeability means that the probability that the German patient’s test gave f1, the Scottish’s gave 
f2, and the Italian’s will give f3, is numerically equal to the probability that the German’s gave f2, the 
Scottish’s f3, and the Italian’s will give f1; and likewise for all six possible permutations of the three 
results. Keeping the same fixed fMRI results f1, f2, f3, we now consider three healthy patients instead, 
who may also live in different times and places. Partial exchangeability means that also in this case the 
values of the six possible joint probabilities obtained by permutation must all be equal – but this value can 
be different from the one for the schizophrenic patients considered before. Hence the term “partial”: we 
can freely exchange the joint results within the schizophrenic group and within the healthy group without 
altering their probabilities, but not across groups. This assumption extends in an analogous way to more 
patients. 
The assumption of partial exchangeability might not be completely true when we consider geographical 
or epochal differences, but we may still consider it as a good approximation. We are not making any 
exchangeability assumptions about the probabilities of the health conditions of our patients, though, because 
the incidence of a disease does often change with time and can depend heavily on geographical location. 
To express partial exchangeability mathematically, suppose that the patients i = 1 , 2 , 3 , . . . have health 
condition c = H and the patients i′ = 1′ , 2′ , 3′ , . . . health condition c = S . Then the joint distribution for 
their fMRI results satisfies 
p 
(∧ 
i F 
fi 
i 
∧ 
i′ F 
fi′ 
i′ 
∣∣ ∧ 
i C
H 
i 
∧ 
i′ C
S 
i′ ∧ I 
) 
= p 
(∧ 
i F 
fπ ( i ) 
i 
∧ 
i′ F 
fπ ′( i′) 
i′ 
∣∣ ∧ 
i C
H 
i 
∧ 
i′ C
S 
i′ ∧ I 
) 
for all permutations π of { i } ≡ { 1 , 2 , . . . } , and all permutations π ′ of { i′ } ≡ { 1′ , 2′ , . . . } . (6) 
The assumption of partial exchangeability is simple and quite natural – and very powerful: it implies, 
as shown by de Finetti (1938; Diaconis, 1988, § 3; Bernardo and Smith, 2000, § 4.6), that the joint 
distributions above must have the form 
p 
(∧ 
i F 
fi 
i 
∧ 
i′ F 
fi′ 
i′ 
∣∣ C ∧ I ) = ∫ ∫ [∏ 
i 
qH( fi) 
] [∏ 
i′ 
qS( fi′) 
] 
p( qH , qS | I ) d qH d qS (7)
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where qH, qS are distributions over the possible values of f , and p( qH , qS | I ) is a “hyperdistribution” over 
such distributions, determined by the assumptions I . The double integral (which can be understood as a 
generalized Riemann integral: Lamoreaux and Armstrong, 1998; Swartz, 2001; Kurtz and Swartz, 2004), is 
over all distributions qH, qS. In other words, de Finetti’s theorem say that the joint probability distribution 
for the fMRIs of healthy and schizophrenic patients can be seen as the product of independent distributions, 
identical for healthy cases and identical for schizophrenic cases but different for the two cases, mixed over 
all possible such pairs of distributions with weight p( qH , qS | I ) . 
As a very cursory example, suppose we want the joint probability that a healthy patient has fMRI result 
f and a schizophrenic one f ′. De Finetti’s formula first tells us to consider all possible distributions over 
positive vectors. As usual with infinities, “all” must be made precise by specifying a topology (for details 
see e.g. de Finetti, 1938; Diaconis and Freedman, 1981; Aldous, 1985; Diaconis, 1988); but intuitively these 
distributions comprise, e.g., multivariate truncated normals, gammas, exponentials, truncated Cauchys. . . 
and innumerable distributions that we can imagine and don’t have a specific name for; all with their possible 
parameter values. De Finetti’s formula tells us to choose one distribution qH, from all those possible ones, 
for the healthy case and one qS for the schizophrenic case, and to attach a weight to this pair, p( qH , qS | I ) ; 
then to calculate this pair at the values f , f ′ and multiply them: qH( f ) × qS( f ′) . Then we consider a new 
pair of distributions, attach a weight to them, and again multiply their values at f and f ′. And so on, until 
all possible pairs are considered. Finally we calculate the sum of all such products, weighted accordingly:∫ 
qH( f ) qS( f 
′) p( qH , qS | I ) d f d f ′. 
The generalization of the formulae above to more than two health conditions, or when only one health 
condition is considered, is straightforward. 
As the cursory example above made quite clear, an integral over probability distributions is a mathematic- 
ally complicated object (cf. Ferguson, 1974) and may not seem a great advancement in assigning a value 
to the distribution (5) . In defence of de Finetti’s formula we must say that it is completely manageable 
with discrete data spaces and provides a great insight in the way we reason about probability in relation 
to repeated events (de Finetti, 1937; Lindley and Phillips, 1976; Kingman, 1978; Koch and Spizzichino, 
1982; Dawid, 2013; Bernardo and Smith, 2000, § 4.2). It also has several important consequences for our 
inference, which we now discuss. 
Using de Finetti’s formula and the definition of conditional probability we can rewrite our goal 
plausibility (5) as 
p( F f 0 | C c 0 ∧ D ∧ I ) = 
∫ 
qc( f ) p( qH , qS | D ∧ I ) d qH d qS (8a) 
with p( qH , qS | D ∧ I ) = 
[∏ 
i qci( fi)
]
p( qH , qS | I )∫ [∏ 
i qci( fi)
]
p( qH , qS | I ) d qH d qS 
. (8b) 
The latter is called posterior distribution since it is conditional on all data D . 
Excluding pathological prior distributions (Diaconis and Freedman, 1986), this posterior distribution 
becomes more and more concentrated on two particular distributions 
(
ˆ qH , ˆ qS 
)
, fully determined by the data, 
as our data D comprise a larger and larger number of patients. This concentration occurs independently of 
the original shape of the distribution p( qH , qS | I ) . In this limit our probability distribution (5) becomes 
p( F f 0 | C c 0 ∧ D ∧ I ) ≈ ˆ qc( f ) (9)
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with ˆ qc completely determined by the data D . This would solve our plausibility assessment (5). 
De Finetti’s formula therefore tells us also the theoretical limit by which the pre-test probability for 
the health condition of the patient, P( C c0 | D ∧ I ) , can be improved by the fMRI result. For example, if 
ˆ qc( f ) is more or less uniform in f or has the same peaks in f for each c , then the fMRI is of no use for 
discriminating the health condition of the patient. This result follows mathematically from the assumption 
of exchangeability (6) and the rules of probability calculus, hence no amount of ingenuity could overcome 
this limit. 
In our case the amount of data D is not enough to allow the use of the approximation (9) . We should 
use the general formula (8) , but it is unwieldy in two respects. First, the fMRI result f of a patient is a 
positive-valued vector with 107– 108 components or more (Lindquist, 2008), so the distributions qH, qS are 
highly multidimensional. Second, the formula asks us to consider in principle all such distributions, as 
explained in the example above. 
We tame this double unwieldiness in two ways. First, it is conceivable that not all information contained 
in the fMRI result f of a patient be relevant to discriminate the patient’s health condition c . The integral in 
eq. (8), if it could be performed, would automatically winnow out the relevant information (Jaynes, 2003, 
ch. 17), possibly reducing the problem to a lower-dimensional set in the space of fMRI data. Being unable 
to perform the integral, we must try to apply heuristics based on our understanding of the target conditions 
and perform such dimensional reduction by hand. For example, by employing the hypothesis that in 
schizophrenic patients the time correlation between brain regions is altered with respect to healthy ones. 
We can thus address the first problem by reducing fMRI data f to a manageable set of graph properties f , 
and applying our inference directly on these, as explained in the next section. 
Second, we entertain a working assumption about which features of our graph data { fi } from a set of 
patients are relevant for inferences about new patients. We can, for example, assume that only the first 
and second moments are relevant for making predictions about the graph quantities to be observed in 
the new patients; these moments are then called sufficient statistics . Assumptions of this kind reduce the 
infinite-dimensional space all possible distributions ( qH , qS) to a finite-dimensional space of a parametric 
family of distributions of exponential type, as explained in § 2.4. 
2.3 Trimming the data space: functional connectivity 
The preprocessed functional image in standard space, in which the activity for each voxel is recorded, 
consists of approximately 1017 time series of 140 time points. We reduce this huge data space by the 
following steps. 
First, we consider only the activity of the voxels belonging to the 94 regions defined by the lateral cortical 
Oxford atlas (see § 2.1 and Desikan et al., 2006) and average the activity of all voxels in a region (details 
in § 4.1). Second, we measure the functional connectivity defined by the Pearson correlation coefficient 
between pairs of regions, obtaining 94 × 93 / 2 = 4371 connectivity weights. This is still a considerable 
data space for our computational resources, so we select d = 40 connectivity weights that exhibit the 
greatest difference in their connection weight average across the schizophrenic and healthy groups. 
The resulting distributions for four of these connectivity weights are depicted in fig. 1. Note that for each 
considered brain connection, the histograms of the healthy group and the schizophrenic group display 
significant overlap, such that none of them could be used in isolation to reliably discriminate between two 
groups.
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Figure 1. Distributions of functional connectivities of schizophrenic and healthy patients. Normal- 
ized density histograms of connectivity weights for healthy ( H , yellow, solid) and schizophrenic ( S , red, 
dashed) patients of four cortical connections selected to demonstrate our statistical framework. Empirical 
means are shown as vertical lines. All connectivities for healthy and schizophrenic patients have substantial 
overlap, evidenced by the darker regions in the histograms. 
Our data space is therefore vastly reduced, from [0 , ∞ [1017 
to [ − 1 , 1]40. We let the symbol f stand for the set of connectivity weights extracted from the fMRI data, 
rather than the full fMRI data themselves. With this new meaning of the symbol f , the likelihoods for the 
health conditions (5) and de Finetti’s formulae (7) – (8) remain formally unchanged, but now involve a data 
space with much fewer dimensions. 
2.4 Trimming the distribution space: models by sufficiency and generalized normals 
2.4.1 Parametric models 
The integrals in de Finetti’s formulae (7) – (8) still represent a mixture of all imaginable pairs of probability 
distributions ( qH , qS) over the space [ − 1 , 1]d, and are therefore extremely complex. We now examine two 
ways to reduce this integral to a manageable set of distributions and to obtain analytically tractable formulae.
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In the Bayesian literature, the complication of considering all possible distributions qc( f ) of the quantity 
f is typically sidestepped by restricting them to a finite-dimensional set of distributions Lc( f | θc) , identified 
or indexed by a finite number of parameters θc. For this reason, such a set is called a parametric family of 
distributions. An example of parametric family is the set of d -variate normal distributions parameterized by 
their mean µ and covariance matrix Σ . With this restriction, the integrals in de Finetti’s formulae (7) and 
(8) represent mixtures of distributions within the parametric family, the weight for each distribution being 
represented by a weight for its parameters. That is, we are no longer considering mixtures of all possible 
multivariate truncated normals, gammas, exponentials, etc., as in the example of § 2.2, but only mixtures of 
truncated normals, say, with different means and covariance matrices. These integrals are thus ordinary 
finite-dimensional integrals. What happens to formulae (7)–(8) is that 
qc( f ) is replaced by Lc( f | θc) , p( qH , qS | I ) d qH d qS is replaced by p( θH , θS | M , I ) d θH d θS . (10) 
The distribution Lc is called the likelihood of the parameters θc , and p( θH , θS | M , I ) is the prior parameter 
distribution. A parametric family and a prior distribution over its parameters are jointly called a parametric 
statistical model, which we denote by M . The term “model” is justly criticized by some probability 
theorists (see e.g. Besag & Kalman in Besag et al., 2002) but widely used, so we shall adopt it here. 
In our present problem, the parametric statistical model needs not be the same for all health conditions: 
for example, we could use normal distributions for one condition and beta distributions for another, if that 
choice better reflected the distributions of connectivity weights under the two different health conditions. 
For this reason, we use the subscript “ c ” in the formulae above. The likelihood we want to determine, 
eq. (5), thus becomes, from eq. (8) with the replacements (10), 
p( F f 0 | C c 0 ∧ D ∧ M ∧ I ) = 
∫ 
Lc( f | θc) p( θH , θS | D , M , I ) d θH d θS (11a) 
with p( θH , θS | D , M , I ) = 
[∏ 
i Lci( fi | θci)
]
p( θH , θS | M , I )∫ [∏ 
i Lci( fi | θci)
]
p( θH , θS | M , I ) d θH d θS 
. (11b) 
2.4.2 Models by sufficient statistics 
The choice of a statistical model often appears as an art and a matter of experience. Notable statisticians 
have voiced concerns over the esoteric character of this choice. Dawid (1982a, p. 220) says: “Where do 
probability models come from? To judge by the resounding silence over this question on the part of most 
statisticians, it seems highly embarrassing”. And Diaconis (1988, § 8, p. 121) remarks: 
de Finetti’s alarm at statisticians introducing reams of unobservable parameters has been repeatedly 
justified in the modern curve fitting exercises of today’s big models. These seem to lose all contact 
with scientific reality focusing attention on details of large programs and fitting instead of observation 
and understanding of basic mechanism. It is to be hoped that a fresh implementation of de Finetti’s 
program based on observables will lead us out of this mess. 
Authors like these have also tried to develop intuitive methods to choose a model, for example by proving 
that a parametric family can be uniquely determined by some symmetry assumptions about our inferences, 
or by other information-theoretical properties (Bernardo and Smith, 2000, ch. 4; Lindley, 2008, § 5.5; an 
enlightening discussion of this topic is given by Dawid, 2013). In the present study we want to emphasize, 
as Cifarelli & Regazzini (1982) did, that a statistical model can be chosen by selecting a sufficient statistics
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(Kolmogorov, 1942; Freedman, 1962; Diaconis and Freedman, 1980, 1981; Cifarelli and Regazzini, 1982; 
Lauritzen, 1988; Diaconis, 1992; Kallenberg, 2005, and the textbook references above). Here is an example. 
Imagine that we have patients labelled i′ ∈ { 1′ , 2′ , . . . } , and n patients labelled i ∈ { 1 , 2 , . . . } , all with 
the same health condition. Of the second set of patients we also know the connectivity weights { fi } 
obtained by fMRI. We want to specify the joint probability distribution p( { fi′ }| { fi } , I ) that the fMRIs 
of the patients { i′ } yield connectivity weights { fi′ } , conditional on our knowledge of the connectivity 
weights of the n patients { i } . Now assume that the probabilities for the fMRI results are exchangeable, so 
that de Finetti’s formulae (7) and (8) hold. Also assume that in order to specify the joint distribution we do 
not need the full set of data { fi } , but only their number n and some statistics, e.g. the empirical mean and 
covariance matrix of these data,
f := 
1
n 
∑ 
i fi , Cov( f ) := 
1
n 
∑ 
i( fi − f )( fi − f )⊺; (12) 
the rest of the details of the data { fi } being irrelevant. In other words, we are assuming that the statistics 
above are sufficient for us to make predictions as if we had the full data. In symbols, 
p( { fi′ }| { fi } , I ) = p( { fi′ }| n,f , Cov f , I ) . (13) 
If this is true no matter the number of patients { i′ } and { i } , then these statistics are called (predictive) 
sufficient statistics . There are several notions of sufficiency, including the traditional one by Fisher (1922) 
and Neyman (1935), but they all are more or less equivalent (Bernardo and Smith, 2000, § 4.5.2). 
The assumption of the existence of sufficient statistics has a very important consequence for de Finetti’s 
formulae (7) and (8) : the space of possible prior distributions is hugely reduced, constrained to be 
non-zero only over a parametric family of distributions that is determined by the sufficient statistics. The 
replacement (10) takes place, leading to the simpler formula (11) for the likelihoods of the health conditions. 
The number of parameters is equal to that of the sufficient statistics. The proof of this reduction was given 
by Pitman and Koopman (Koopman, 1936; Pitman, 1936; Darmois, 1935; for generalizations, e.g. to the 
discrete case, see Hipp, 1974; Andersen, 1970; Denny, 1967; Fraser, 1963; Barankin and Maitra, 1963). 
When the sufficient statistics are the mean and covariance matrix, as above, the likelihoods turn out to be 
(truncated) multivariate normal distributions. 
In the slightly more complicated case of two or more health conditions and the assumption of partial 
exchangeability (6) , this theorem leads to formula (11) with likelihoods Lc determined by the sufficient 
statistics that we have chosen for the different health conditions (Bernardo and Smith, 2000, § 4.6). The 
prior distribution over the parameters of the likelihoods, p( θH , θS | I ) , is not determined by the theorem, but 
has to be determined by other consideration that can again involve symmetry and information theory. 
As we mentioned in the introduction, the notion of sufficient statistics can be a helpful bridge between 
biophysical considerations and the specification of probabilities. It may be easier to conceive and understand 
a connection between biophysical considerations and some statistics of our measurements, than between 
biophysical considerations and an abstract multidimensional distribution function. Once such statistics 
are selected, they in turn uniquely select a probability distribution for us. Vice versa, if a statistical model 
based on some sufficient statistics proves to be very reliable in its predictions, we may conclude that its 
sufficient statistics must have an important biological meaning. 
In the rest of this study we shall use three statistical models determined by three different sufficient 
statistics. Our choice of statistics is unfortunately not biologically motivated, as such models have yet
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to be determined for fMRI data. However, they are adequate to demonstrate the approach and we hope 
that authors with more experience will pursue this line of thought and derive better-motivated sufficient 
statistics. 
2.4.3 Edgeworth’s “method of translation”: generalized normal models 
The assumption of a sufficient statistics makes the integrals in de Finetti’s formulae (7) and (8) finite- 
dimensional, but these integrals and other expressions that depend on them, like the post-test probabilities, 
may still lack a closed form and be analytically intractable. In this case we could use numerical methods, a 
computationally costly possibility we consider in the Discussion, § 3.3. In the present work we choose 
models with closed-form formulae instead; their swift calculation facilitates the model comparison to be 
illustrated later. 
Our starting point is an analytically tractable model by sufficient statistics that has been the subject of 
much study (Gelman et al., 2014, § 3.6; Minka, 2001; Murphy, 2007): it has a normal likelihood, with 
mean λ and covariance matrix Λ as parameters, and a normal-inverse-Wishart prior distribution over these 
parameters. This parameter prior maintains the same functional form when updated with training data; 
this kind of prior is called conjugate (DeGroot, 2004, ch. 9; Diaconis and Ylvisaker, 1979). This model is 
outlined more in detail in § 4.2. 
We try to make the normal + normal-inverse-Wishart model more flexible by combining it with an 
idea that Edgeworth (1898) called “Method of Translation”, discussed also by Johnson (1949) and Mead 
(1965): the transformation of a quantity into a normally distributed one. That is, instead of considering the 
connectivity weights f , we consider transformed quantities l ( f ) , where l is a component-wise monotonic 
function, and suppose the latter quantities to be normally distributed. This leads to generalized-normal 
likelihoods of the form 
N[ l ( f ) | λ , Λ ] l ′( f ) d f (14) 
where N is the normal distribution with mean λ and covariance matrix Λ , and l ′ is the Jacobian determinant 
of l . 
This simple idea has an amazing scope: it allows us to explore a vast range of non-normal likelihoods – 
in particular likelihoods defined on bounded domains such as [ − 1 , 1]d – and to keep the low computational 
costs of the conjugate prior. In our present problem it has also an additional convenient feature: in the 
calculation of the post-test probability, the Jacobian determinant l ′ disappears, as eq. (19) below shows. 
These generalized-normal models, which we denote by Ml, are also determined by a choice of sufficient 
statistics, analogous to eq. (12): the mean and covariance matrix of the transformed data { l ( fi) } ,
l ( f ) , Cov[ l ( f )] . (15) 
In our partially exchangeable case, with formulae (11) , we need to specify a likelihood Lc for each health 
condition c . We assume these two likelihoods LH, LS to be functionally identical generalized normals, 
i.e. the function l is the same for the healthy and the schizophrenic case; but their means and covariance 
matrices ( λH , ΛH) and ( λS , ΛS) can be different. 
We also need to specify a joint parameter prior for ( λH , ΛH; λS , ΛS) . To use the analytic advantage 
of the conjugate prior, we assume that the distribution for these parameters is a product of independent
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distributions: 
p( λH , ΛH; λS , ΛS | Ml , I ) = p( λH , ΛH | Ml , I ) × p( λS , ΛS | Ml , I ) , (16) 
each of them being a normal-inverse-Wishart distribution described in § 4.2. This independence assumption 
is quite strong and has an important consequence: the likelihood for a health condition only depends on the 
data from previous patients having that same health condition . 
With the assumptions above, the likelihood for the health condition needed by the clinician has a closed 
form for this model (see § 4.2). The likelihood for patient 0 ’s being healthy, in view of the patient’s 
measured connectivity weights f , and given the data ( fi) from previous nH healthy patients, is
p( fMRI result f | healthy ∧ prior info ) = t 
[ 
l ( f )
∣∣ νH − d + 1 , δH , κH+1κH ( νH − d +1) ∆H ] ∏ 
k 
l ′( fk) , (17) 
where t is a multivariate t distribution with νH − d + 1 degrees of freedom, mean δH, and scale matrix 
κH+1
κH ( νH − d +1) ∆H. This distribution has covariance matrix 
κH+1
κH ( νH − d − 1) ∆H (note the different denominator 
from the scale matrix), and approaches a generalized normal for large νH. The final factor is the Jacobian 
determinant of l . 
The most important feature of this likelihood is the dependence of the coefficients ( κH , δH , νH , ∆H) on 
the data ( fi) of the previous nH healthy patients: 
κH = κ0 + nH , νH = ν0 + nH , 
δH = 
κ0 δ0 + nH l ( f )
κ0 + nH 
, ∆H = ∆0 + nH Cov[ l ( f )] + 
κ0 nH
κ0 + nH 
[
l ( f ) − δ0 
][
l ( f ) − δ0 
]⊺ 
, 
(18) 
where ( κ0 , δ0 , ν0 , ∆0) are prior coefficients that represent the clinician’s knowledge before any patients 
were observed. As the number nH of observed healthy patients increases, the probability for the transformed 
data l ( f ) tends to a normal distribution with mean and covariance matrix equal to the empirical average 
and covariance matrix of the transformed data. The formulae above show that previous data enter only 
through the sufficient statistics l ( f ) and Cov[ l ( f )] . 
An analogous formula holds for the likelihood for the patient’s being schizophrenic, with coefficients 
( κS , δS , νS , ∆S) that depend on the data of previous schizophrenic patients and some initial coefficients. The 
function l and the prior coefficients ( κ0 , δ0 , ν0 , ∆0) could be different for the healthy and schizophrenic 
cases, but for simplicity we assume them identical for both health conditions. 
If (ˆ pH , ˆ pS) is the pre-test probability distribution for the health condition of patient 0 , his post-test 
probability to be healthy is
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P( healthy | fMRI result ∧ prior info ) = 
t 
[ 
l ( f )
∣∣ νH − d + 1 , δH , κH+1κH ( νH − d +1) ∆H ] ˆ pH
t 
[ 
l ( f )
∣∣ νH − d + 1 , δH , κH+1κH ( νH − d +1) ∆H ] ˆ pH + t [ l ( f )∣∣ νS − d + 1 , δS , κS+1κS ( νS − d +1) ∆S ] ˆ pS . (19) 
Note that the Jacobian determinants l ′ do not appear in this formula. 
2.4.4 Generalized normal models in our study 
In the rest of our study we compare three different transformations l of the connectivity weights f , with 
one set of prior coefficients ( κ0 , δ0 , ν0 , ∆0) each: 
Logit-normal model: A slightly modified logit transformation 
l ( fk) := ln 
1 + fk
1 − fk , l 
′( fk) = 
2
1 − f2 k 
, (20) 
with prior coefficients 
κ0 = 1 , δ0 = 0 , ν0 = d + 1 , ∆0 = ( d + 2) Id . (21) 
Tangent-normal model: A tangent transformation 
l ( fk) := tan
π fk
2 
, l ′( fk) = 
π
1 + cos π fk 
, (22) 
with prior coefficients 
κ0 = 1 , δ0 = 0 , ν0 = d + 1 , ∆0 = 
d + 2
4 
Id . (23) 
Normal model: An identity transformation (that is, no transformation at all) 
l ( fk) := fk , l 
′( fk) = 1 , (24) 
with prior coefficients 
κ0 = 1 , δ0 = 0 , ν0 = d + 1 , ∆0 = 10 Id . (25) 
For brevity we shall denote l ( f ) := 
(
l ( fi)
)
. 
The first two transformations, plotted in the upper panel of fig. 2, map the bounded domain ] − 1 , 1[ of 
the connectivity weights into the reals, and thus restrict the generalized-normal likelihood to meaningful 
values of the connectivity weights. The last model instead allows for connectivity weights outside their 
meaningful bounds. It can be conceived as the model of a person who has no precise knowledge of what
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Figure 2. General normalized models. Upper panel: Generalized logit and tangent transformation functions 
as defined in the text. Lower panel: Prior distributions for any connectivity weight f conditional on the 
three generalized normal models defined in the text 
the quantities f are. Since the clinician’s final predictions concern health conditions given data f , not the 
data f themselves, this model can still be meaningfully used. The probabilities for the connectivity weight 
fi conditional on the prior coefficients above are shown in the lower panel of fig. 2. 
The prior coefficients are chosen by the following criteria: uniform marginal distributions of the correla- 
tions between connectivity weights (leading to ν0 = d + 1 as explained before); large uncertainty in the 
location parameters ( κ0 = 1 ); symmetry with respect to the origin ( δ0 = 0 ); a prior distribution for the 
connectivity as flat as possible (its second derivative vanishes at the origin, leading to the values of ∆0 
above). In the case of the identity transformation we have chosen a ∆0 that somewhat concentrates the 
prior around the true range of the connectivity weights, [ − 1 , 1] .
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The numerical values of the main quantities used throughout this study are summarized in table 1. 
nH = 55 healthy patients 
nS = 49 schizophrenic patients 
d = 40 graph parameters 
κ0 , δ0 , ν0 , ∆0 prior coefficients: see eqs (21), (23), (25) 
Table 1. Numerical values in our study 
2.5 Model comparison and selection 
2.5.1 Criteria for model comparison 
Any two statistical models differ in two main characteristics: their predictive power and their learning 
speed. Predictive power is a model’s capacity to give high probability to propositions that turn out to be 
true, during and especially after its learning phase (cf. Dawid, 1982b). Learning speed is how quickly a 
model reaches unchanging, stable predictive probabilities as it gets updated with new data; note, however, 
that a model may also never reach stable probabilities (see e.g. Bruno, 1964; Berk, 1966); “Alas, this seems 
like a model of the way things work in practical inference – as more data comes in, one admits a richer 
and richer variety of explanatory hypothesis” (Diaconis, 1988, § 3, p. 113). Thus, our choice of a model 
depends on the relative importance we give to these two characteristics. 
These two characteristics need not go hand in hand: a model can quickly learn with very little data but 
settle on probabilities with poor predictive power; conversely, it can reach great predictive power but only 
after a long learning phase with a huge amount of data. A model can also “unlearn”, i.e. its predictive 
power initially increases and then decreases before stabilizing. The latter phenomenon can happen because 
every model initially makes its prediction through a mixture of likelihoods – the integral (11) , in our case 
the t distribution (36) – but as the training continues the mixture is replaced by a single likelihood, in our 
case a generalized normal (14) , as explained in § 2.4.3. It may happen that the mixture of likelihoods has 
higher predictive power than a single likelihood, and in this case a decline in predictive power will be 
observed. A model with such behaviour is obviously unfit for the clinician’s goal; this also means that the 
sufficient statistics on which it is based capture very poorly the differences in connectivity weights between 
health conditions. 
When only a small amount of training data is available, it can be difficult to assess which of two models 
has or will have the greater predictive power. The first model can initially reach a greater predictive power 
than the second, but the second model may eventually reach greater predictive power than the first, with 
further training data. Models having the same likelihood, however, have the same final predictive power; 
their learning speeds depend on their parameter priors. 
In a diagnostic problem like that faced by our clinician, the choice of a model is ultimately dictated by 
the predictive power of the post-test probabilities given by the model; but if we have little training data, the 
learning speed of the model is also of some importance. Several quantitative criteria can be conceived to 
assess these two characteristics: 
1. the post-test probabilities the model gives to the correct health conditions for all training data, i.e. 
P( c1 , c2 , . . . ) ;
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2. the post-test probabilities the model gives to the correct health conditions in the final phase of the 
training only, i.e. P( clast | c1 , c2 , . . . ) ; 
3. the expected utility the model yields for all training data; 
4. the expected utility the model yields in the final phase of the training only. 
Post-test probabilities (criteria 1, 2) are important for obvious reasons, and utilities (criteria 3, 4) are 
important because the clinician’s overall problem is one of decision, as emphasized in the Introduction. 
Consideration of all data (criteria 1, 3) is important if we are interested in the performance of the model for 
the whole set of patients; but consideration of the final data only, conditional on the previous ones (criteria 
2, 4), tells us how much the model has learned (compare with a similar remark in model comparison using 
Bayes factors by Berger and Pericchi, 1996). 
We must keep in mind that these criteria assess a statistical model not by itself but in combination with 
other factors, since they also depend on pre-test probabilities (which can be influenced by other diagnostic 
tests) or utilities. 
Applied to our models, each of these four criteria gives a very similar picture. We shall calculate the 
results for criteria 2 and 4, the latter with two different utility tables. This calculation can be explained in 
very intuitive terms: 
Imagine that the nH = 55 healthy and nS = 49 schizophrenic patients visit the clinician in turn, in 
an unknown order. For each patient, let us further assume that the clinician has pre-test probabilities 
(ˆ pH , ˆ pS) = (0 . 5 , 0 . 5) , i.e. she is completely uncertain about the patient’s health condition. The incidence in 
the population is much lower than 50%, of course, but the patients presenting themselves for diagnosis are 
not representative of the full population. 
As stated in § 2.2, pre-test probabilities represent the clinician’s uncertainty before the fMRI test is made; 
they can be based for example on a first diagnosis considering symptoms and medical history of the patient 
and of the patient’s family, on psychological evaluations, and on other diagnostic tests. Here we assume 
complete uncertainty for demonstration purposes. 
The clinician acquires the fMRI result f for that patient, and uses the statistical model, trained with the 
data from all the patients that previously visited her, to update to a post-test probability for schizophrenia 
pS, given by eq. (19) ; obviously pH = 1 − pS. Now the clinician must make a decision – say, treat or dismiss 
– based on the expected utilities of the decisions available. Each decision has a different utility depending 
on the patient’s true health condition, as summarized by a table. We consider two tables: a symmetric one 
(symmetric) healthy schizophrenic
dismiss 1 0 
treat 0 1 
(26) 
and an asymmetric one 
(asymmetric) healthy schizophrenic
dismiss 1 − 2 
treat − 1 2 
(27) 
In order to maximize the expected utility, as explained in § 4.3, the clinician dismisses the patient if 
pS < 1 / 2 in the case of the symmetric utility table, and if pS < 1 / 3 in the case of the asymmetric one; and
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treats the patient otherwise. After the clinician’s decision is made, the patient’s true health condition is 
revealed and we record the actual utility gained for each table, and the post-test probability the clinician 
assigned to the true health condition, or its logarithm, usually called “negative surprise” (Bartlett, 1952; 
Good, 1956, 1957a). The health condition and fMRI data of this patient are used to update the model. The 
next patient is received, and so on, until all patients have been examined. 
The particular sequence of utilities and log-probabilities recorded in the manner just described depends 
on the exact order by which the 104 patients visit the clinician. We take an approximate average over all 
possible 104! ≈ 10166 orders by randomly sampling 520 000 of them. The values of these averages for the 
final patient constitute the quantitative criteria 2 and 4. 
With the symmetric utility table (26) , the average utility is also the average number of schizophrenic 
patients for which the model yields pS > 1 / 2 . The average utility for the last patient, when the model has 
been trained with the rest of the patients, is therefore a form of leave-one-out cross-validation (Allen, 1974; 
Stone, 1974; Kotz et al., 2006, vol. 2, pp. 1454–1458). The asymmetric table (27) , slightly more realistic, 
tells us that dismissing a schizophrenic patient has worse consequences than treating a healthy one, and 
treating a schizophrenic patient has better consequences than dismissing a healthy one (McKenzie, 2014; 
Ho et al., 2000). For this reason the patient is dismissed, more conservatively, only if pS < 1 / 3 . Note that 
scaling a utility table by a positive factor or shifting its values by a constant represent changes in the unit of 
measure and in the zero of utilities, and therefore do not affect our relative comparison of the statistical 
models. 
2.5.2 Results for our three models 
The averaged sequences of utilities and log-probabilities calculated as in § 2.5.1 are shown in fig. 3. 
The R code for the calculation is publicly available (Porta Mana et al., 2018). The results, summarized in 
table 2, are qualitatively identical by the two criteria and two utility tables we chose: the normal model 
gives the best values for the final patient, followed by the logit-normal model; the tangent-normal model 
has the worst final predictive power, at or below chance level. 
symmetric utility (26) asymmetric utility (27) log-probability
normal model 0 . 80 0 . 70 − 0 . 29 
logit-normal model 0 . 75 0 . 66 − 0 . 34 
tangent-normal model 0 . 56 0 . 03 − 0 . 60 
chance 0 . 50 0 . 41 − 0 . 69 
Table 2. Final results for the three models 
The plots of fig. 3 illustrate the points made at the beginning of § 2.5.1: one model can initially learn 
faster than another and yet be overtaken in the later stages of learning; this is the case for the logit-normal 
and normal models. The tangent-normal model shows strong unlearning; this means that a tangent-normal 
likelihood and its sufficient statistics do not distinguish well between healthy and schizophrenic conditions. 
The slight downward bends at the final stages of the logit-normal and normal models raise the suspicion 
that they might also show some unlearning if further training data were supplied. 
The trends of the logit-normal and normal models suggest that the learning phase is not finished: more 
patients are needed before their predictive probabilities become stable. This is also evident from the updated
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Figure 3. Averaged sequence of utilities, with utility tables (26) and (27) , and of log-probabilities for our 
three models. The standard deviations of the averages are smaller than the markers’ size. The average 
values for the first and last patients are exact. 
marginal distributions of their parameters ( λH , ΛH; λS , ΛS) , for example those for the connectivity weight 
f between the left superior parietal lobule and left lingual gyrus, shown in fig. 4 for the logit-normal model. 
The distributions of the location parameters ( λH , λS) have reached the empirical means of the data, but
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Figure 4. Updated distributions of the logit-normal model for the location parameters ( λH , λS) (left), 
scale parameters ( ΛH , ΛS) (right), and connectivity weights fH, fS (bottom, superposed on the empirical 
distributions) for the connectivity between left superior parietal lobule and left lingual gyrus, corresponding 
to the bottom left panel of fig. 1. The vertical lines in the first two plots indicate the corresponding empirical 
statistics from the data. 
those of the scale parameters ( ΛH , ΛS) are still very far away from the empirical variances. The reason is 
that the prior for the scale parameters had a peak at a very large value of Λ ≈ 20 . The 55 data for healthy 
patients and 49 for schizophrenic ones have shifted this peak to ΛH = 1 . 3 and ΛS = 1 . 5 , but more data are 
needed to shift these peaks to even smaller values – provided that in the meantime the empirical values do 
not change too much as new data are gathered. 
The peak at high values of Λ is a known inconvenient feature of the normal-inverse-Wishart conjugate 
prior, related to the correlation between correlation and variance components of Λ characteristic of this 
prior (e.g. Barnard et al., 2000). 
2.5.3 Contrast with other model-comparison criteria 
Common Bayesian model-comparison criteria are based on the joint probability that the model gives to 
training data; especially its logarithm, called “weight of evidence” or “marginal log-likelihood”, or the 
ratio of such logarithms, called Bayes factors (Jeffreys, 2003, chs V, VI, A; Good, 1950; MacKay, 1992a; 
Kass and Raftery, 1995). The simple reason is Bayes’ theorem: 
P( model | data ∧ prior info ) ∝ P( data | model ∧ prior info ) × P( model | prior info ) , (28)
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the latter probability usually assumed the same for all models (but see Porta Mana, 2017). A higher weight 
of evidence means that the model is more probable. 
In our study, however, we have two kinds of data: health conditions and fMRI results. Since the likelihood 
for the health condition, used by the clinician to arrive at a post-test probability, gives the probability for 
the fMRI results { fi } , it seems intuitive to calculate the weights of evidence of our models based on these 
data. The result is the opposite of what we obtain with the averaged-utility criterion or any of other three 
mentioned above. We obtain: 
ln p( fMRI results | logit-normal model ∧ health conditions ) = − 1913 , 
ln p( fMRI results | tangent-normal model ∧ health conditions ) = − 1858 , 
ln p( fMRI results | normal model ∧ health conditions ) = − 2488 , 
(29) 
which gives the normal model a much smaller probability than the other two, and the tangent-normal model 
the highest. 
This discrepancy with the averaged-utility criterion is not completely surprising, though. Imagine a 
disease that leads to no differences at all between the fMRI results of patients with the disease and those of 
healthy controls. If we found a statistical model that predicted the fMRI results with certainty, this model 
would thus have a the highest weight of evidence (zero), and yet its final average utility would be at chance 
level, since it could not help us at all in telling healthy from diseased patients. For our problem the right 
comparison and selection criterion is the utility or one of the other three criteria previously listed. 
2.5.4 Final assessment of models 
The average-utility criterion clearly excludes the tangent-normal model, which even shows a rapid 
unlearning. The logit-normal and normal models have almost similar performances, at around 75 – 80% 
of final patients correctly treated. We can also plot the sequence of utilities averaged over healthy and 
schizophrenic patients separately, as in fig. 5, which gives us an idea of the ratio between true and 
false negatives, and true and false positives. Both models show around 35% false positives (dismissed 
schizophrenic patients), with the normal model giving slightly higher final rates of true negatives, 93% , 
and true positives, 65% , than the normal, 85% and 63% . 
However, we emphasize that the features used as inputs to the model were selected using a very simple 
heuristic (maximum difference in means between the two groups, see § 2.3), and the statistical model was 
selected for its computational properties rather than its fit to the distributions of connection weights derived 
from fMRI data. This notwithstanding, we believe that with further training, the logit-normal model could 
reach a higher predictive power. The reason is that some empirical distributions of connectivity weights, 
like the one for schizophrenic patients shown in red in fig. 4, seem to be bimodal; and the logit-normal 
likelihood, unlike the normal one, is capable of bimodality, thus fitting these distributions better. 
Our assessment, however, is just an illustrative example for the general method discussed in this paper, 
and we are not earnestly proposing the logit-normal model (nor any other specific model) as the optimal 
one to use in the problem of diagnosing schizophrenia. We note that any model assessment and selection 
using the average-utility metric depends on several important quantities and assumptions: 
A. the pre-test probabilities given by the clinician; we assumed these to be (0 . 5 , 0 . 5) ; 
B. the clinician’s range of decisions; we assumed it to be simply “treat or dismiss”, but it could comprise 
several different kinds of treatments;
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Figure 5. Sequence utilities averaged over healthy (left) and schizophrenic (right) patients separately, for 
the logit-normal and normal models 
C. the utilities of the clinician’s decisions; we assumed these to be as in formula (37); 
D. the ratio between the numbers of healthy and schizophrenic training data; 55 / 49 = 1 . 12 in our case; 
E. the clinician diagnoses one patient at a time. 
For a proper model assessment we should therefore investigate and consider more realistic rates of 
healthy vs schizophrenic cases that visit a particular clinician, in order to have better-informed pre-test 
probabilities; and we should consider more realistic decisions available to the clinician, together with 
realistically quantified utilities. 
Assumption E. deserves some explanation as it may mistakenly appear that it doesn’t matter whether 
patients visit the clinician simultaneously or one at a time. Suppose two patients, Tom and Joe, visit the 
clinician together, and the clinician obtains fMRI data for both, fT and fJ. The joint post-test probability 
for their health conditions cT and cJ is different from the one obtained first calculating Joe’s one, say, and 
then Tom’s using Joe’s results: 
p( cT , cJ | fT , fJ , D , Ml) ̸ = p( cT | fT , cJ , fJ , D , Ml) × p( cJ | fJ , D , Ml) . (30)
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This inequality can be easily verified by applying the probability product rule to the left side, and can be 
understood as follows. Suppose the clinician first wants to calculate the likelihood for Joe’s being healthy. If 
Tom is schizophrenic then his fMRI result is unimportant for Joe’s likelihood, owing to our assumption of 
independent priors (16) . But if Tom is healthy, then his fMRI result, which is known to the clinician , should 
lead to an updated model for Joe’s likelihood. The likelihood for Joe’s being healthy is therefore a mixture 
of these two possible likelihoods, with weights proportional to the post-test probability for Tom’s health 
condition. Thus, Joe’s likelihood is affected by Tom’s fMRI result even if Joe’s is calculated first and Tom’s 
health condition is not yet known. More generally, if several patients visit the clinician simultaneously, she 
should order diagnostic fMRI tests for all of them at once and calculate a joint post-test probability for 
them, in order to make the best-informed prediction for each. 
3 DISCUSSION 
3.1 Summary 
The diagnosis of a medical condition is a complex process that takes in a variety of judgements and 
evidence from the clinician and from any diagnostic tests available to her. Bayesian probability theory has 
found wider acceptance in medicine because it can consistently combine and frame such judgements and 
evidence (Goodman, 1999; Davidoff, 1999; Greenland, 1998). Formulae (1) – (3) show the basic scheme 
of how the clinicians’ judgements and the results of diagnostic tests are combined (Sox et al., 2013). The 
role of a diagnostic test is not simply to give a dichotomic answer, e.g. healthy/ill, but a likelihood for 
each health condition, to be combined into this scheme together with the likelihoods from other tests. The 
final probability obtained from these likelihoods is finally used by the clinician to decide upon a course of 
action, e.g. dismiss/treat (§ 4.3). 
The values of likelihoods from such tests need to be determined from a set of training set of data for each 
health condition. In this work we have discussed how to determine the likelihoods when the diagnostic test 
and training set consist of fMRI data, considering for concreteness the case of schizophrenia as the disease 
in question, and by using real fMRI data from healthy and schizophrenic patients (§ 2.1). We derived them 
step by step from first principles through a sequence of assumptions: 
(a) Partial exchangeability with respect to the health conditions, explained in § 2.2. We believe this 
assumption to be very natural in medical diagnostics. By itself it already leads to a specific expression 
for the likelihood, eq. (8), although this expression is very difficult to compute. 
(b) Sufficiency of an empirical statistics of a reduced set of fMRI data (§§ 2.3–2.4). We believe such kind 
of assumption to be sound and at least approximately true when neurologically motivated, and moreover 
it provides a bridge between biophysical considerations and the specification of probabilities. It leads to 
a likelihood, eq. (11), amenable to numerical or analytic computation. 
(c) Prior knowledge of the empirical statistics for the different health conditions (§ 2.4.4). An assumption 
of this kind is always necessary, especially with small training data sets; but it affects our inferences 
less and less as our training data accumulate. 
In our study, for (b) we specifically assumed the sufficiency of the first and second moments of some 
functions (§ 2.4) of the functional-connectivity weights obtained from the fMRI data (§ 2.3). Our focus 
on connectivities was neurologically motivated, but our choice of first and second moments of particular 
functions was made for mathematical simplicity, in order to illustrate the method. Our choice of roughly flat,
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conjugate priors for assumption (c) was also made for the sake of mathematical simplicity and illustration 
(§ 2.4.4). 
Notwithstanding our simple, mainly illustrative choices, we obtained good diagnostic performances, 
briefly discussed in the next section. To assess these performances and the relative predictive power of 
different choices in assumption (b) above, we presented several criteria, based on decision theory (§ 2.5). 
These criteria also help in understanding whether the training of the likelihoods has stabilized (§ 2.5). We 
observed that in this kind of study decision-theoretical criteria can yield results in seeming contrast with 
Bayesian model-comparison criteria, like weights of evidence and Bayes factors (§ 2.5.3); but this contrast 
is understandable and is not a sign of inconsistency. 
We emphasize that the analysis and conclusions presented here are just illustrations of the general method, 
and are not meant to be used for real diagnoses: as explained in §§ 2.4.2 and 2.5.4, for a real application 
we would first need to investigate better-informed sufficient statistics, realistic decisions available to the 
clinician, the latter’s utilities, and realistic pre-test probabilities. In this study we used simple default values 
for illustrative purposes only. 
3.2 Comparison with other studies and methods 
In this study we used a rather naive approach, explained in § 2.3, to select a subset of brain connections 
for our analysis. That approach can be criticized in two different ways. First, it ignores the fact that if 
distributions are narrow, the means can be close together without much overlap, and that such distributions 
are likely to be more informative for the purposes of discrimination. This could be improved, for example, 
by taking the minimal area of the distributions’ overlap (dark red area in fig. 1) instead. Second, we did 
not restrict our search for suitable connections and associated brain areas to the areas that are known 
to be part of resting-state networks identified in previous studies, like the default mode network. Our 
lack of specificity, though, was motivated by previous studies which have demonstrated that functional 
connectivity can be also measured in other task-related networks, induced by spontaneous activity (He 
et al., 2009), and that in resting state different activity patterns can appear in schizophrenic patients, owing 
e.g. to hallucinations during the scan (e.g. Shergill et al., 2000). 
Despite our simplified and possibly unrealistic choices of connectivity weights, sufficient statistics, 
parameter priors, pre-test probabilities, and utility functions, we obtained a diagnostic performance of 80% , 
measured by leave-one-out cross-validation (§ 2.5), comparable to classification results based on fMRI 
data reported in previous studies (e.g., Venkataraman et al., 2012, 18 healthy + 18 schizophrenic patients; 
Cetin et al., 2016, 45 + 46 patients; Demirci et al., 2008, 36 + 34 patients ). 
Our results also compare with classification results that we achieved using machine-learning methods. 
Cross-validation tests using support-vector machines (using 80% of the data for training and 20% for 
testing in a randomized iterative way) also yielded around 80% of correct diagnoses (data not shown). 
But, as explained in the Introduction (points I., II.), methods like these, which simply classify or 
are deterministic, do not fit the clinician’s decision-theoretical problem: they cannot be combined with 
other diagnostic tests and do not fit a general decision-theoretic approach – cf. §§ 2.5.1, 4.3. Most 
machine-learning methods (Bishop, 2006; Murphy, 2012) are thus ruled out. 
There is no real contrast, however, between machine-learning methods and the method presented here: 
machine-learning algorithms can be interpreted as convenient, fast approximations of Bayesian methods 
(see e.g. the explicative image in Huszár, 2017), often combined with default utility functions and decision
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rules (Murphy, 2012; MacKay, 2003, 1992a,e,d,c,b). A machine-learning classification algorithm that gives 
a good performance can suggest good likelihoods or parameter priors to be used in a statistical model. For 
example, the simplest version of a support-vector machine (Bishop, 2006, ch. 7; Murphy, 2012, § 14.5) 
can be interpreted as a model where the likelihood LH( f | θH) for one health condition is very large in a 
half of the dataspace f ∈ [ − 1 , 1]d and zero in the rest, the hyperplane separating these half-spaces being 
determined by the parameter θH. The likelihood LS( f | θS) for the other health condition is likewise large 
or zero in two half-spaces separated by a hyperplane determined by θS; see eqs (11) in § 2.4.1. In this 
model the parameter prior p( θH , θS | M , I ) correlates the two parameters ( θH , θS) in such a way that the 
two hyperplanes coincide and the two likelihoods have support on opposite sides. As the model is trained 
and the parameter prior is updated, eq. (11b) , the hyperplane moves in space in a way to maximize the 
product of the likelihoods. This corresponds to the search of an optimal separation hyperplane by the 
support-vector machine. 
3.3 Possible improvements 
Besides using more realistic pre-test probabilities, and utility values, the method presented here could be 
improved in several other respects, especially with regard to assumptions (b) and (c) summarized in § 3.1. 
In point (b) we assumed that particular connectivity weights are sufficient to distinguish among schizo- 
phrenic and healthy patients. These connectivities were calculated as in §§ 2.3 and 4.1. More sophisticated 
choices of Regions Of Interests and functional-connectivity measures (Marrelec and Fransson, 2011; Smith 
et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2014; Gheiratmand et al., 2017; Demirci et al., 2008) or even integration of 
functional and structural imaging (Michael et al., 2010) could obviously lead to an increased predictive 
power. A different choice of sufficient statistics could also improve the performance. With increased 
computational power it would even be possible to use the full set of connectivities rather than sufficient 
statistics thereof – so-called “nonparametric” models (cf. Zhang et al., 2014, 2016; Nielsen et al., 2016; 
Kook et al., 2017). 
Regarding assumption (c), in § 2.4.3 we mentioned that parametric models may lead to probabilities 
that lack a closed form and are analytically intractable. The models we chose, with conjugate prior, have 
the advantage of having closed-form formulae, but they also restrict our choice of sufficient statistics and 
parameter priors. Higher predictive power could be achieved by using other kinds of sufficient statistics, 
leading to likelihoods that are not generalized normals, or by using non-conjugate priors, e.g. treating 
means, correlations, and variances independently, as discussed by Barnard et al. (2000). In this case 
numerical methods are needed, such as Markov-Chain Monte Carlo sampling and integration (MacKay, 
2003, ch. IV; Murphy, 2012, chs 23–24). It must be kept in mind, though, that numerical methods can be 
computationally vastly more expensive than analytic ones. In preliminary studies that led to our present 
work we considered a couple of statistical models that require Monte Carlo sampling: a truncated normal 
and a product of beta distributions among them. The calculation of the relevant integrals for these models 
has vastly higher time costs than for the closed-form models presented here. For example, calculation of 
a posterior parameter distribution for the truncated-normal model required 17 h on a computer cluster; 
whereas the corresponding calculation for the models in the present work takes a fraction of a second on a 
laptop. To assess and select a model for our clinician to use, such integrals need to be computed over and 
over, as we explained in § 2.5.1. The assessment of statistical models that require Monte Carlo methods 
can therefore lead to months of computation. Further explorations are needed in this direction. 
The comparison with support-vector machines sketched at the end of the previous section shows one 
important assumption of our statistical models: the independence of the prior parameter distributions for
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the two health conditions: p( θH , θS | I ) = p( θH | I ) × p( θS | I ) , see eq. (16) . Statistical models of which 
support-vector machines are approximations clearly cannot make this assumption. The performance of the 
model might improve by using a non-independent joint prior distribution, which allows training data for one 
health condition to influence the parameter distribution for the other. In the case of the generalized-normal 
models we examined, this can be achieved – whilst preserving their computational convenience – by taking 
a weighted average of several values of prior coefficients (33) . This is known as a hierarchical model 
(Bernardo and Smith, 2000, § 4.6.5). 
The possibilities for improvement listed in these last paragraphs suggest that the method we have 
presented here, hinging on first principles, has great potential for applications and for development in 
different directions; moreover this is not to the exclusion of other methods, but assimilating their principles 
and advantages. 
4 METHODS 
4.1 Data preprocessing 
Preprocessing of the rfMRI images is carried out using the FMRIB Software Library tools ( FSL , v5.08: 
Jenkinson et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2005) and consists of the following steps: removal of the first ten image 
volumes, leaving the remaining 130 volumes for further data processing; removing non-brain tissue ( B ET : 
Smith, 2002); motion correction ( MCFLIRT : Jenkinson et al., 2002); spatial smoothing with a 6 mm full 
width at half maximum normal kernel; temporal low-pass filtering with a cut-off frequency of 0 . 009 Hz ; 
white matter and cerebrospinal fluid regression ( FSL regfilt, MELODIC ). 
For each subject we first linearly register the rfMRI image first to the structural, skull-removed image 
(image segmentation for skull removing with SPM 8 , Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, 
London, UKFSL ; linear registration with FSL / FLIRT : Jenkinson and Smith 2001; Jenkinson et al. 2002) and 
then, through a non-linear mapping, to the MNI standard brain (non-linear registration with Advanced 
Normalization Tools ( ANT S : Avants et al., 2011); MNI 152 standard brain, non-linear 6th generation 
(Grabner et al., 2006). Regions of interest (ROIs) of the resulting functional image in standard space are 
extracted such that they match the 94 regions identified by the Oxford lateral cortical atlas with a probability 
above 50% (Desikan et al., 2006). The temporal mean signals across the voxels in each ROI are used to 
calculate the functional connectivity measured based on the Pearson correlation coefficient. 
4.2 The normal model with conjugate prior 
This statistical model, denoted in this section by M , is amply discussed in the literature (Gelman et al., 
2014, § 3.6; Minka, 2001; Murphy, 2007); here we only give a summary. 
Its likelihood is a normal distribution 
L ( f | λ , Λ , M , I ) = N[ l ( f ) | λ , Λ ] l ′( f ) (31) 
with mean λ and covariance matrix Λ . 
The prior distribution for the parameters ( λ , Λ ) is a normal-inverse-Wishart distribution, i.e. the product 
of a normal distribution for λ and an inverse-Wishart matrix distribution (Gupta and Nagar, 2000, § 3.4;
27
 Porta Mana, Bachmann, Morrison Health conditions from fMRI data
Tiao and Zellner, 1964; Bernardo and Smith, 2000, § 3.2.5) for Λ : 
p( λ , Λ | κ0 , δ0 , ν0 , ∆0 , Ml , I ) = p( λ | Λ , κ0 , δ0 , Ml , I ) × p( Λ | ν0 , ∆0 , Ml , I ) , (32) 
with 
p( λ | Λ , κ0 , δ0 , Ml , I ) = N( λ | δ0 , Λ /κ0) , 
p( Λ | ν0 , ∆0 , Ml , I ) = Wishart-1( Λ | ν0 , ∆0) ∝ det( Λ )− 
ν0+ d +1
2 exp
(−12 tr ∆0 Λ− 1 ). (33) 
It should be noted how Λ appears as parameter in the distribution for λ , so their distributions are not 
independent. The composite distribution depends on two scalar, one vector, and one matrix coefficients 
( κ0 , δ0 , ν0 , ∆0) . 
This prior parameter distribution retains the same form when it is conditioned on the data ( fi) of n 
patients, becoming a posterior parameter distribution with updated coefficients ( κ, δ , ν , ∆ ) depending on 
the prior ones and on the sufficient statistics: 
κ = κ0 + n, ν = ν0 + n, 
δ = 
κ0 δ0 + nf
κ0 + n 
, ∆ = ∆0 + n Cov( f ) + 
κ0 n
κ0 + n 
(
f − δ0 
)(
f − δ0 
)⊺ 
. 
(34) 
The main features of the normal-inverse-Wishart distribution for ( λ , Λ ) are these: 
λ : mean & mode = δ , covariances = 
1
κ ( ν − d − 1) ∆ ; 
Λ : 
   
mean = 
1
ν − d − 1 ∆ , mode = 
1
ν + d + 2 
∆ , 
diagonal variances = 
2
( ν − d − 3)( ν − d − 1)2 ( ∆ )k k 
2 . 
(35) 
These formulae above say that the uncertainty in the location parameter λ decreases as κ and ν increase for 
fixed ∆ , and the uncertainty in the matrix scale parameter Λ decreases with increasing ν . When ν = d + 1 
the marginal distributions for the correlations of λ are uniform (Gelman et al., 2014, § 3.6; Barnard et al., 
2000, § 2.2). Because of these properties, a “vaguely informative” parameter distribution should have small 
κ0 and ν0 (Minka, 2001; Murphy, 2007). 
When the likelihood (31) and the parameter prior (32) , updated with (34) , are multiplied and the 
parameters are integrated, the resulting distribution for f is a multivariate t distribution (Kotz and Nadarajah, 
2004; Minka, 2001; Murphy, 2007) 
p[ f | ( fi) , κ0 , δ0 , ν0 , ∆0 , Ml , I ] ≡ p( f | κ, δ , ν , ∆ , Ml , I ) = t 
[ 
l ( f )
∣∣ ν − d + 1 , δ , κ +1κ ( ν − d +1) ∆ ] (36) 
with ν − d + 1 degrees of freedom, mean δ , scale matrix κ +1κ ( ν − d +1) ∆ , and covariance matrix κ +1κ ( ν − d − 1) ∆ . 
4.3 Decision theory and utility 
Once we have the post-test probabilities ( pH , pS) for the possible health conditions of a patient given the 
fMRI data, there remains to decide upon a course of action. This is the domain of decision theory (Raiffa 
and Schlaifer, 2000; Jaynes, 2003, chs 13, 14; Sox et al., 2013, chs 6, 7).
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Suppose we have only two courses of action: treat T or dismiss D . A decision-theoretical analysis needs, 
besides the probabilities for the health conditions, also the utilities (or costs) of choosing an action given the 
patient’s true health condition. For example, treatment of a healthy patient could harm the latter, or it could 
be innocuous. With two courses of action and two health conditions we have four utilities udecision | condition: 
healthy schizophrenic
dismiss uD | H uD | S
treat uT | H uT | S 
uD | H > uT | H , 
uT | S > uD | S . 
(37) 
Typically uD | H > uT | H and uT | S > uD | S, and uD | H, uT | S are positive and uT | H, uD | S negative if we appropriately 
shift the zero of our measurement units. 
The expected utilities for dismissal and treatment are therefore 
E( uD) = uD | H pH + uD | S pS , E( uT) = uT | H pH + uT | S pS . (38) 
Decision theory says the clinician ought to chose the action having maximum expected utility. For example, 
she dismisses the patient if E( uD) > E( uT) , that is if 
pS < 
uD | H − uT | H
uD | H − uT | H + uT | S − uD | S 
. (39) 
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